Research Foundation for Governance: in India

The Bar Council of India (BCI), under the stewardship of Mr. Gopal Subramaniam by announcing for an All India Bar Exam has initiated a much needed reform in the Indian legal system. With nearly 60,000 graduates entering the legal profession every year, it became hugely critical that these graduates be screened before being allowed to represent clients and be a part of the justice delivery mechanism.

The Bar exam will contain 100 multiple choice questions and will be conducted on December 5, 2010.

While, Research Foundation for Governance in India (RFGI), Ahmedabad supports this step in principle whole heartedly, it believes that some important inquiries remain unaddressed.

Firstly, does the BCI even have the mandate to conduct such an exam? In V. Sudeer v. Bar Council of India, the Supreme Court had held that introducing any eligibility criteria to the practice of law other than what is stipulated by Section 24 of the Advocates Act, 1961 would be unconstitutional. We believe thus, that a Bar exam would require, fore-mostly, an amendment to the Advocates Act.

Secondly, it seems the BCI’s decision to conduct a Bar exam is a hasty one. The present CLAT (common law admission test) which is held for admission into 11 National Law Universities was in the pipeline for nearly 3-4 years. It was only after long debates, discussions and deliberations that the CLAT, in its present form came into being.

This hurried decision by the BCI to conduct a Bar Exam has put many a present finalist students to disadvantage. Student concerns, asking for a deferral of the exam were well represented in this petition to Mr. Gopal Subramaniam. See this link: http://www.legallyindia.com/images/stories/docs/letters/bar-exam-NUJS-students-letter-to-BCI.pdf

Also it remains to be seen how BCI would be able to successfully satisfy the logistic requirements and administrative capabilities required for an exam of this magnitude in such a short time.

Thirdly, it must be noted that the Bar Council of India has also conceptualised a common law entrance test (CLET) for admission into all the law colleges in India. We believe that a CLET should have essentially preceded the Bar Exam. It is only after ensuring that our law students are capable enough to study law that can we legitimately expect them to clear an exam which tests their eligibility to practice in the bar.

Fourthly, the BCI announced that the Bar exam is intended to check for ‘eligibility’ and not ‘expertise’ and that it requires ‘a basic amount of preparation’ to pass. RFGI believes that the standards of the bar exam must be raised from an exam testing mere ‘eligibility’ to an exam which tests the ‘competency’ of the candidates.

Finally, the Bar exam will cost the aspirant a huge amount of thirteen hundred rupees. It is pertinent to note that BCI has involved Rainmaker, a private legal talent management company for running the bar exam. While, we have no reasons to doubt Rainmaker’s capabilities to conduct the test, we would humbly like to ask: are law students being made to pay for the profits of a private company?

RFGI, is however, unequivocal in its support for a Bar exam. We congratulate the Bar Council of India on this superlative step. However, we believe that the above mentioned questions deserve BCI’s attention and hope that they will be answered very soon.

When I first looked the Research Foundation for Governance (RFGI) up on the internet, I was happily surprised with how well structured the website was. After reading the introduction, the goals and methods and the section about the RFGI team, I was sure this was going to be the perfect internship for me. Although I always try not to have any expectations at all, the introduction material and articles that I had read left me with the expectation of joining a major organisation which would have been around since at least 5 years or more. Furthermore, after seeing a small part of her extensive and impressing resume, I thought Miss Kanan Dhru would probably be a well established, experienced and educated lady in the age of 50+.

When I arrived at the office, I found myself happily suprised with both the age of the organisation and its team. I can say that I have never come across such a young vibrant and ambitious organisation that gets things done. Many think tanks, NGO’s and other organisations out there are positively motivated but sometimes lack the persistence, expertise and connections to actually deliver. RFGI is not one of them. It gets things done and raises the bar for itself and others time and time again.

Soon I found myself doing a range of projects and activities pertaining to political and legal reforms and spreading awareness. I have had the most wonderful interactive sessions with hundreds of students and schoolchildren, and was pleasantly surprised by the immense successes our sessions had. Schools offered us to provide them with an educational programme and more visits as soon as possible.

Organizing events like the panel discussions and public debates was always a very exciting task. The December 13th event at the Ahmedabad Management Association was called ‘Is India’s legal system hampering the growth of its economy and democracy?’ was attended by many students, lawyers, press representatives and high ranking officials. The discussion sessions during all of our events were a perfect platform for different sectors of the community to interact with each other and provided the tools to collectively think of solutions to realize better governance.

The public debates we have organised were the first of their kind in Gujarat. Themes like compulsory voting laws and the event called: ‘Has the Indian constitution fulfilled its promises?’ on the eve of 60th Republic day of India attracted young people and others from different backgrounds to engage in live debate. Newspapers recognised the progressive steps we were taking, and followed our moves with great interest.

One of the most interesting projects for me was the research on Inner-party politics (IPD). When I joined the project, I realized how difficult the task would be to make an attempt at breaking through the outer shells of political parties and getting an insiders perspective. Especially for a foreigner to this great country. However, I found myself overwhelmed with input from all angles and sectors of society. Everywhere we went, people seemed eager to inform us about the theory and practice of Indian politics. Everybody realized the importance of the issue we were working on. Lawyers, students, journalists, politicians, party members and many others offered their important support and cooperation. In working on this project, I have gained an immense wealth of experience and knowledge about Indian society, politics and culture.

Now that the booklet is on its way to getting published, and my time at RFGI is coming to an end, I can look back at a wonderful time providing me with many lessons, experience and fun times. I am very grateful to Kanan, Kelly, Swar and all the other interns and volunteers who have made my time here so interesting and pleasant. I am proud to be a part of this young organisation, and to have helped shape it in a small way. And I am sure with this mindset, drive and momentum RFGI is on the way to a very bright future. GO RFGI!

- By Ramiro Gomes Monteiro
Political History and International Relations student at Utrecht University, Netherlands

The Curious Cycle of Non-Lawyers at 17[i]

Swethaa Ballakrishnen[ii]

Two years ago, mostly because I was curious if my peers thought the same way about our shared legal education, I interviewed forty odd alumni from the national law schools. My initial impetus was to make the case that these schools provided an elite education that was more or less non-quantifiable. While they granted open pathways to six figure (dollar) salaries and prestigious admission offers, I offered that the value was more in the systemic advantage of credentialism and network creation rather than in the actual education.

Primarily, the hunch was a Weberian extension of status group and control to my own circle of college friends who were now in positions of relative power in their respective careers. As part of an exclusive elite, it seemed like they determined ways (mostly by taking it for granted) to gain advantages from the systems (top recruitment offers, easily transferable job prospects) in forms that later monopolized the benefits within the same group (for e.g. when they were in positions of power, they recruited from their own/similar schools). It was clear that by drawing from the wealth of what was once friendly college ties, these graduates relied on the social capital of their networks to further enhance the value of their elite education within the same peer group[iii]. As an NALSAR’04 graduate remarked of the resourcefulness of her connections  –

“We just know (emphasis intended) each other. There is an enforced bonding that happens over five years of being isolated from the rest of the world and when we graduate, this bonding and networking carries to the next stage of law firms, Corporates, judicial clerkships, graduate schools etc. and consequently makes it easier for members of this close-knit community to break in than for outsiders.”[iv]

The value in the education, then, was not in the training, but instead, the perceived[v] difference. And successful entry into the institutional framework guaranteed benefits of credential that were measured in ways independent of quantifiable merit. And putting aside my reservations of inequality (that I will subsequently dwell on), this credentialing on the system of networks, unlike I initially envisaged, was not entirely a disadvantage.

By creating a sense of branding, these networks (and therefore, these schools), were beginning to offer their students an array of opportunity that was otherwise unnatural for an Indian law graduate. Part of this had to do with the fact that the newly global marketplace demanded more imaginative lawyering roles, but nevertheless, in some part at least, it was the validity provided by these close social ties that allowed students from these schools the option of not being traditional litigating lawyers alone. With their differentiating status, the scope of what a law student could do on graduation expanded: irrespective of whether (s)he actually did it[vi]. As one graduate commented about his choice of attending law school:

“…. I figured that even if I hated and/or was really bad at the law, I would in no way be constrained in terms of my options at the end of the course and could easily branch out into something altogether different. A very important reason was the fact that law school always left open the option to not be a lawyer (emphasis supplied)[vii]”

Thus, these schools, which initially started with an ambition to create socially relevant lawyers, had metamorphosed to an even nobler position: they had became centers of accreditation that allowed their students the luxury of chasing multiple career and educational trajectories, only one of which was to be a lawyer. And despite the popular criticism that these schools “have not served the legal system”, in my mind, without doubt, it is this luxury of transformation that remains the system’s finest achievement.

Yet, my issue with this credentialism resonates critically for other reasons of equality. This social capital and ensuing professional freedom the system provides for its products is indeed powerful, but as demanding of attention is the fact that the sorting that determines these winner-take-all beneficiaries takes place at, approximately, age seventeen!

As high school students unclear about career trajectories, these elite domestic graduates are sorted by a sponsored mobility system that favors the urban elite student with the socio-cultural (educated families knowing the advantage of a school with top opportunities, command over written and spoken English to do well in the classroom, etc) and to some extent, economic (to be able to afford and access preparatory classes to gain admission to these schools and after, to attend them) background to enter and excel in these schools. Using one example (NLSIU’05, Oxford’06):

My father told me to give the Law School entrance exam as a ‘back-up’ – in case I didn’t do too well in the Class XII Board exams. It seemed like a good idea at the time – you see, he is a wise man. I think I got my Entrance results before my Board results. I was a little surprised when I learned that I’d got in – not because I thought that I wasn’t smart enough or didn’t write a good paper or that I wasn’t serious about getting into law school – its just that I didn’t think too much about Law School after I wrote the exam. While the Board exams results were not bad, they were not great either. So I went to law school.

Thus, while it might well be the case that these national law schools have more rigorous curriculum than the other models of legal education in the country, it is unclear that this is the reason they are considered elite. By selecting high school students through a competitive examination that has a low acceptance rate, these schools pre-select an efficient cohort of highly motivated (if not also smart) students who will push themselves towards creating new opportunity not so much because of the schools, but sometimes despite the structural limitations of the systems.

This is clearly, only the first cut of an obviously larger project. Further research to locate the exact nature and impact of this sorting will be useful in deciphering the arguable unequal stratification. This could entail an enquiry with a larger sample set (my observations reflect interviews with about 45 alumni and survey data from about 80 current students at these law schools). Further, accounting for particular, perceived advantages in both this training (initial income disparity, immediate earning requirements, capacity to deal with law school debt, external credentials, access to more elite networks) and access to it (parental SEI, differential spatial distribution among successful applicants, class perception, resultant language skills), will not be out of order to push the suggested hypothesis.

But an even more effective study of the educational choices and its impacts within the system, requires a keener understanding of the profession in itself. While an attempt has been made here to suggest a possible disconnect between the actual technical and cultural / social advantages that these schools provide, a deeper dive will necessarily involve a larger study of the profession, with a focus on the creation, control and protection of the status groups (some non-national) within it.

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[i] A longer version of this paper is forthcoming in the Journal of Commonwealth Law and Legal Education (Spring 2010). Please forward comments to Swethaa@stanford.edu.

[ii] B.A., B.L.(Hons) (NALSAR), LL.M (Harvard). Currently, the author is a Sociology Ph.D Candidate at Stanford University where she studies institutional theory, elite network dynamics and stratification, mainly relating to higher education and the professions with a focus on South Asia.

[iii] In limited illustration of this peer group dynamic, of the twelve students from India who were admitted to Harvard Law School’s LL.M program in 2008 (the largest South Asian graduate student cohort at the school), only one (who had attended an undergraduate institution in India) was not a graduate of the national law school. Author data on file. February 2008.

[iv] Interestingly, this alumni joined a top law firm on graduation where almost every (if not all) first year associates who joined that year were from one of the national law schools.

[v] From interviews and observation, it seemed unclear that there was an actual difference in these schools in terms of quantifiable structure. “Did these students learn more law? Perhaps (and mostly because they had stern attendance requirements and constant evaluation). Did they have better faculty? Debatable. Were alumni from these schools better first year associates at top law firms because they were trained in a certain school or, instead, because they were selected into that school a certain way? Unclear”. Author interview on file, January 2010.

[vi] And not only did they think they could do anything – they in fact could explore more options with the safety net of this elite degree. In the course of my interviews, I spoke with alumni from these schools who, on graduation, spent time being non-lawyers. One alumni from NLSIU (’05) had spent a year taking a photography course in the South Indian hill station of Ooty and an alumni from NALSAR (’04) had spent the last three years in the Delhi theatre circuit. Yet both these graduates were applying and had been accepted into prestigious law school programs abroad (Cambridge, Columbia, respectively) and were entirely successful, because of their credential, in making the considering veering back into law when it suited them. Seen as bright intellectuals (and not necessarily, lawyers) they could perceivably do anything with their education and still be regarded as suitable for legal study / practice on their return. Author Interviews on File, February 2008.

[vii] This graduate went on to graduate with a Rhodes scholarship with, potentially, all the unbridled opportunity that he had hoped for on admittance. Author Interview on File, February 2008.

With the passing of the Gujarat Local Authorities Laws (Amendment) Bill of 2009, (herein “the bill”) the State Assembly has made voting compulsory. While there are good arguments for and against the bill, at present only some of the details have been worked out. Specifically, all eligible voters in Gujarat must cast their ballot in Municipal, Nagarpallika and Panchayat elections or be subjected to punishment. Non-voters would have 30 days to explain their absence to avoid punishment. And if voters don’t like any of the candidates they have the option of a “none of the above” vote, although it is not yet clear what would happen if “none of the above” were the most popular ballot.

While it is new to India, compulsory voting is used in many countries. In Australia voting has been legally mandatory since 1924, where non-voters must either explain their absence or pay a fine. In Peru, where voting has been compulsory since 1933, citizens must carry proof of their having voted in order to obtain certain social services provided by the state. In many more countries, voting is legally required but rarely enforced. These include Paraguay, Thailand, Egypt and Costa rica, among others.

The bill has attracted a variety of responses, but both critics and supporters are premature. While we have the text of the bill in hand, we have no idea what it will amount to in practice. In theory, the bill makes voting in state elections mandatory, but it does not spell out the consequences of not voting. At this point we do not know whether there will be a light punishment, a harsh punishment, or any punishment at all for failing to vote. The sanctions chosen by the state government will play a large role in determining whether this law bends towards unnecessary coercion, or remains a mere suggestion.

Proponents of the bill dismiss the concerns over coercion. They point out that we already accept government coercion in many instances – for example, taxes are a coercive use of state power, as are the actions of police officers. So, they argue, why should we be concerned about coercing people to elect their governments?

But the existence of some coercion does not justify any amount of coercion used for any reason. For example, requiring citizens to have voted in order to access any government service or bureaucracy is fairly extreme, and many might consider it far more coercive than is necessary to achieve higher voting turnouts. On the other hand, a fine of only a few rupees might be an acceptable amount of coercion comparable to the taxes that citizens are already coerced into paying. The question, then, is not whether any coercion is acceptable, but what level of coercion is acceptable to achieve certain goals.

Without knowing how it will be enforced, we can at best guess at the positive and negative outcomes of the bill. On the plus side, it may in fact encourage more voting. Some critics have argued that compulsory voting will be irrelevant to those who already care about politics, since they would vote in any situation, and it will be unfairly coercive to those who wish not to vote. The result, they say, is that the only increase in voter turnout will be among those who will just spoil their ballot or vote randomly.

But reality is more complex than this. Surely there are also people who do care about politics, but for whatever reason fail to vote – perhaps they were too busy, simply forgot, or are just too lazy to make the trip. A small fine might be enough of a cost to compel them to make a stronger effort to get to the polls. If this is the case, then the resulting government would, in fact, have a larger mandate since more individuals who had an opinion were able to express their preferences by electing their government.

Proponents argue that it will be easier for political parties to campaign on issues, since they will no longer have to spend funds simply trying to encourage people to vote. And because the entire population – or at least, a vast majority – are voting, the resulting government would have a stronger mandate. However both of these arguments assume that compulsory voting will actually increase voter turnout. Although in some cases this has happened – in Australia, voter turnout is often 95% – we cannot be sure that it would have the same effect in Gujarat. Especially when we still do not know how the government will be enforcing the law.

It is possible that the punishment will be far more severe than a small fine. The state assembly could opt for a scheme similar to the one used in Peru, where access to any government service would be contingent on having voted. This is not only extremely coercive, but it is also very unfair. The poorest in society are often those who depend the most on access to government services like BPL cards, free education or employment through schemes such as NREGA. For these people, failing to vote – or choosing not to vote – could have a severe negative impact on their lives. They could lose their job, lose their source of income, or have their children turned out of school. Meanwhile, the wealthy and middle classes who can survive without government assistance would be hardly inconvenienced by such a punishment. We must ask ourselves if a slightly higher voter turnout is so important as to warrant such severe and potentially unjust methods.

Many are also skeptical of how this law would be implemented. If the political establishment has a hard time getting their message out to the population today, how can they be sure they can inform the entire population of their new obligation to vote? And if a million people fail to vote in upcoming elections, does the state election commission have the capacity to apply some punishment to each and every one of them? As Jasmine Shah of the Jaagte Raho campaign notes, many electoral rolls are still filled with errors. If the government can’t even sort out who can vote, can they really sort out who must vote?

Perhaps the most worrisome thing about this bill is the precedent it sets for both voting and citizenship. Compulsory voting reshapes our view of democracy – no longer is it a right, but a duty to be involved with the political process. If we think that “voting with your feet” by avoiding the polling booth is an act of freedom of expression, then we must oppose this criminalization of non-voting. If the bill restricts access to social services, then it is reshaping our notion of citizenship. No longer is it enough to simply be a citizen of India to access the benefits promised by the constitution – you must also take part in elections.

For the state government to make a responsible decision there must be informed discussion. The population and our elected politicians must carefully weigh the benefits and harms that could result from carrying through with this plan. It is disappointing that the bill passed largely free of opposition in the State Assembly, and if punishments for non-voters are ever discussed we hope that all MLAs take a thorough look at the legislation and its potential consequences. Whether voting should be a responsibility or a right – and how such a responsibility should be enforced – is a fair topic of debate, but such decisions should not be made quickly and without public input. Perhaps we should begin by forcing our politicians to actually debate legislation before we worry about forcing citizens to elect them.

(This piece has been developed by Joshua J.M. Stark, winter 2009 intern at RFGI)

GUJARAT BILL NO. 23 OF 2009

THE GUJARAT LOCAL AUTHORITIES LAWS (AMENDMENT) BILL, 2009

An Act further to amend the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, Guajrat Nagarpalika Act, 1963 and Gujarat Panchayat Act 1993

Be it enacted in the 60^th year of the Republic of India as follows:-

1. (i) This Act may be called the Gujarat Local Authorities Laws (Amendment) Act, 2009.

(ii) This Act shall come into force immediately and the remaining provisions of this Act may come into force on the date prescribed by the State Government. Separate dates may be decided for different provisions.

1. In Section 5 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act (hereinafter referred to as the Municipal Corporation Act):-

(i)                 In subsection (5), the words ‘one third’ may be substituted by ‘one half’

(ii)               In subsection (6), the words ‘one third’ may be substituted by ‘one half’

(iii)             In subsection (7), the words ‘one third’ may be substituted by ‘one half’,

1. The following provisions may be added in the Section 16 of the Municipal Corporation Act:-

The duty to vote (Municipal Corporation)

16 K (1) It shall be the duty of a voter eligible to vote for the Municipal Corporation to vote for the Municipal Corporation elections. However, as prescribed in Sub-section 2, he/she would be free to vote for none of the existing candidates.

(2) In case the eligible voter wishes not to exercise his/her vote in favour of any of the existing candidates, he/she shall, as will be directed by the rules, vote in favour of the ‘none of the above’ option.

16 Kh Regarding declaring the voter as a defaulter voter

(1) The election officer appointed by the State Election Commission, may hold a voter who has not exercised his/her right to vote in the Municipal Corporation elections as a defaulter voter after giving a notice in the format prescribed under the rules.

(2) State Government will be authorized to prescribe disincentives/consequences against the defaulting voter as per the prescribed rules to be tabled before the State Assembly.

16 G Strong and Sufficient reasons for not voting

An eligible voter shall be relieved of his duty to vote in the Municipal Corporation elections in cases of:

(1) Incapacity due to illness or any other physical weakness or any other physical incapacity

(2) Being absent from the State/Nation on the day of the election, or

(3) Any other strong and sufficient reasons prescribed by the State Government by rules in consultation with the State Election Commission.

16 Gh Notice

(1) The Election Officer will send a notice to the voter who does not vote in the Municipal Corporation elections.
(2) To vote in the elections is the duty of an eligible voter and if it is found that the eligible voter has defaulted, the Election Officer will inform him/her about the same. The eligible voter will have to give reliable documentary evidence such as medical certificate/copy of the passport etc to justify his/her not voting.
(3) If the reply to the notice as mentioned in subsection (1) above is not made within one month, or if the reasons not to vote are not informed in writing to the Election Officer and if the reasons given are not sufficient, then the Election Officer shall pass a written order declaring him/her as a defaulting voter.

16  Chh Appeal

(1) The eligible voter aggrieved by the order of the Election Officer under Section 16 Gh, can appeal to the Officer nominated by the State Election Commission within the period of one month in the format prescribed under the rules.

(2) The Appellate Officer may pass an order after giving a right to hearing to the appellant. The order of the Appellate Officer shall be final.

The duty to vote (Nagarpallika)

15 K (1) It shall be the duty of a voter eligible to vote for the Nagarpallika to vote for the Nagarpallika elections. However, as prescribed in Sub-section 2, he/she would be free to vote for none of the existing candidates.

(2) In case the eligible voter wishes not to exercise his/her vote in favour of any of the existing candidates, he/she shall, as will be directed by the rules, vote in favour of the ‘none of the above’ option.

15 Kh Regarding declaring the voter as a defaulter voter

(1) The election officer appointed by the State Election Commission, may hold a voter who has not exercised his/her right to vote in the Nagarpallika elections as a defaulter voter after giving a notice in the format prescribed under the rules.

(2) State Government will be authorized to prescribe disincentives/consequences against the defaulting voter as per the prescribed rules to be tabled before the State Assembly.

15 G Strong and Sufficient reasons for not voting

An eligible voter shall be relieved of his duty to vote for the Nagarpallika elections in case of:
(1) Incapacity due to illness or any other physical weakness or any other physical incapacity
(2) Being absent from the State/Nation on the date of election, or
(3) Any other strong and sufficient reasons prescribed by the State Government by rules in consultation with the State Election Commission.

15 Gh           Notice

(1) The Election Officer will send a notice to the voter who does not vote in the Nagarpallika elections.
(2) To vote in the election is the duty of an eligible voter and if it is found that the eligible voter has defaulted, the Election Officer will inform him/her about the same. The eligible voter will have to give reliable documentary evidence such as medical certificate/copy of the passport etc to justify his/her not voting.
(3) If the reply to the notice as mentioned in subsection (1) above is not made within one month, or if the reasons not to vote are not informed in writing to the Election Officer and if the reasons given are not sufficient, then the Election Officer shall pass a written order declaring him/her as a defaulting voter.

15  Chh Appeal

(1) The eligible voter aggrieved by the order of the Election Officer under Section 15 Gh, can appeal to the Officer nominated by the State Election Commission within the period of one month in the format prescribed under the rules.

(2) The Appellate Officer may pass an order after giving a right to hearing to the appellant. The order of the Appellate Officer shall be final.

The duty to vote (Panchayat)

34 K (1) It shall be the duty of a voter eligible to vote for the Panchayat to vote for the Panchayat elections. However, as prescribed in Sub-section 2, he/she would be free to vote for none of the existing candidates.

(2) In case the eligible voter wishes not to exercise his/her vote in favour of any of the existing candidates, he/she shall, as will be directed by the rules, vote in favour of the ‘none of the above’ option.

34 Kh Regarding declaring the voter as a defaulter voter

(1) The election officer appointed by the State Election Commission, may hold a voter who has not exercised his/her right to vote in the Panchayat elections as a defaulter voter after giving a notice in the format prescribed under the rules.

(2) State Government will be authorized to prescribe disincentives/consequences against the defaulting voter as per the prescribed rules to be tabled before the State Assembly.

34 G Strong and Sufficient reasons for not voting

An eligible voter shall be relieved of his duty to vote for the Panchayat elections in case of:
(1) Incapacity due to illness or any other physical weakness or any other physical incapacity
(2) Being absent from the State/Nation on the date of election, or
(3) Any other strong and sufficient reasons prescribed by the State Government by rules in consultation with the State Election Commission.

34 Gh Notice

(1) The Election Officer will send a notice to the voter who does not vote in the Panchayat elections.
(2) To vote in the election is the duty of an eligible voter and if it is found that the eligible voter has defaulted, the Election Officer will inform him/her about the same. The eligible voter will have to give reliable documentary evidence such as medical certificate/copy of the passport etc to justify his/her not voting.
(3) If the reply to the notice as mentioned in subsection (1) above is not made within one month, or if the reasons not to vote are not informed in writing to the Election Officer and if the reasons given are not sufficient, then the Election Officer shall pass a written order declaring him/her as a defaulting voter.

34 Chh Appeal

(1) The eligible voter aggrieved by the order of the Election Officer under Section 34 Gh, can appeal to the Officer nominated by the State Election Commission within the period of one month in the format prescribed under the rules.

(2) The Appellate Officer may pass an order after giving a right to hearing to the appellant. The order of the Appellate Officer shall be final.

By Kanan Dhru

Arguing law is one of the most demanding professions, not only in terms of intellectual alertness or the time commitment it requires but also the role it plays in facilitating justice in the society. In India, it is mainly through the pool of arguing lawyers, that the High Court and Supreme Court judges are appointed. Therefore, it is imperative that only the finest and most committed individuals are encouraged to enter the profession.

However, it is extremely worrying that the Bar today fails to attract meritorious students, who lack family background in litigation. In a recent survey conducted by the Research Foundation for Governance: in India, on the profession of arguing lawyers, 92% of those surveyed believed that family background was necessary to establish one’s self as an arguing lawyer.

Here’s the case in point. Today, when a new-comer joins the profession, he/she is required to work under an established lawyer as a “junior” lawyer. It is believed that the new-comers neither possess the required skills to argue nor the ability to attract clients. Sadly, barring a handful, most law colleges in India fail to impart necessary training or confidence for young graduates to start their own practices.

When the youngsters do start working as ‘junior’ lawyers, they face a system with little regard for grooming or developing upcoming talents. In fact, there are no standards laid down for the minimum training to be procured, required period for juniorship or even minimum pay-scale! As per the survey, 47% of the junior lawyers (under 5 years of practice), do not get paid anything at all. Ironically, their seniors, the established lawyers charge as much as Rs. 5-10 lakh per appearance.

It requires great courage to enter litigation without help or supportive background, since the present system entails uncertainty of future and sometimes, compromising on ethics to work as a lawyer. There are very few who are ready to embrace such bravery. In contrast, the corporate world is ready to welcome these young graduates with open arms with dignity of labour and handsome pay-packages. Young law graduates, in spite of being extremely interested in arguing law, get compelled to sacrifice their dreams and take up other jobs in order to ensure a secure life for themselves and their families. In the end, either children of established lawyers/judges or those who did not succeed in obtaining a job elsewhere, end up in litigation.

Unfortunately, the common perception about underpaying the juniors remains unchanged. Many successful lawyers still feel that it is the privilege of the young lawyers to obtain ‘a learning’ from the senior lawyers. The current system has created a clique of lawyers, judges and other stakeholders, who have developed serious vested interests in the way justice is being imparted. Churning out of promising and idealistic advocates to further the cause of justice does not look like anyone’s priority.

The reality is that most young lawyers who join without a family background have to struggle for many years before they establish themselves. Many of these struggling lawyers resort to means such as getting commission for securing a new case for senior lawyers, helping clients liaison with appropriate agencies, or sometimes even indulging in unethical practices to secure their living. The desire to further the cause of justice for the clients remains a far-fetched dream.

What remains, ultimately, in the hands of such lawyers, struggling for survival is the fate – the fate of the millions crying for ‘justice’; the fate of equity and fairness and the fate of the judicial systems of our country.

It is high time that the profession of litigation becomes attractive for the well-educated bright youngsters. For that, proper incentives such as better pay, better working-conditions, structured process of training and ultimately, more respect by the senior lawyers and judges must become a rule rather than an exception. It becomes an onus for the litigating fraternity to create young role-models who can encourage a large pool of youngsters whose talents must get deployed in furthering the cause of justice in the country, rather than being restricted within the boundaries of the Moot-Court competitions.

Kanan Dhru is the Founder of Research Foundation for Governance: in India.